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AbSTrACT
ethical consequentialist vegetarians believe that farmed animals have lives 
that are worse than non-existence. in this paper, i sketch out an argument that wild 
animals have worse lives than farmed animals, and that consistent vegetarians should 
therefore reduce the number of wild animals as a top priority. i consider objections 
to the argument, and discuss which courses of action are open to those who accept 
the argument.
many consequentialists are vegetarian because they care about the harm done 
to farmed animals. Some consequentialists may be vegetarian because of environ-
mental concerns, and others for non-consequentialist reasons, but these are not my 
main focus here. more precisely then, ethical consequentialist vegetarians believe 
that farmed animals have lives so bad they are not worth living, so that it is better 
for them not to come into existence. Vegetarians reduce the demand for meat, so 
that farmers will breed fewer animals, preventing the existence of additional animals. 
if ethical consequentialist vegetarians1 believed that animals have lives that are un-
pleasant but still better than non-existence, they would focus on reducing harm to 
1. hereafter i drop the qualifiers and use ‘vegetarians’ to mean ‘ethical consequentialist vegetar-
ians’, unless otherwise specified.
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these animals without reducing their numbers, for instance by supporting humane 
slaughter or buying meat from free-range cows.
i will argue that if vegetarians were to apply this principle consistently, the suf-
fering of wild animals would dominate their concerns, and would plausibly lead them 
to support reducing the number of wild animals, for instance through habitat de-
struction or sterilisation.
SUffering in nATUre, And iTS imPliCATionS
if animals like free-range cows have lives that are not worth living, almost all 
wild animals could plausibly be thought to also have lives that are worse than non-
existence. nature is often romanticised as a well-balanced idyll, so this may seem 
counter-intuitive. but extreme forms of suffering like starvation, dehydration, or 
being eaten alive by a predator are much more common in wild animals than farm 
animals. Crocodiles and hyenas disembowel their prey before killing them (Tomasik 
2009). in birds, diseases like avian salmonellosis produce excruciating symptoms in 
the final days of life, such as depression, shivering, loss of appetite, and just before 
death, blindness, incoordination, staggering, tremor and convulsions (michigan 
department of natural resources). While a farmed animal like a free-range cow has 
to endure some confinement and a premature and potentially painful death (stun-
ning sometimes fails), a wild animal may suffer comparable experiences, such as 
surviving a cold winter or having to fear predators, while additionally undergoing 
the aforementioned extreme suffering (Tomasik 2013). Wild animals do experience 
significant pleasure, for instance when they eat, play, have sex, or engage in other 
normal physical activity. one reason to suspect that on average this pleasure is out-
weighed by suffering is that most species use the reproductive strategy of r-selection, 
which means that the overwhelming majority of their offspring starve or are eaten 
shortly after birth and only very few reach reproductive age (horta 2010; ng 1995). for 
instance, ‘in her lifetime a lioness might have 20 cubs; a pigeon, 150 chicks; a mouse, 
1000 kits’ (hapgood 1979), the vast majority of which will die before they could have 
had many pleasurable experiences. overall, it seems plausible that wild animals have 
worse lives than, say, free-range cows. if vegetarians think it’s better for the latter not 
to exist, they must believe the same thing about wild animals.
A second important empirical fact is that wild animals far outnumber farmed 
animals. Using figures from the fAo, Tomasik estimates that the global livestock 
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population is 24 billion (including 17 billion chicken) (Tomasik 2014). i restrict my 
count of wild animals to those at least as complex as chicken or small fish, which 
vegetarians clearly believe do have moral weight. Using studies of animal density in 
different biomes, Tomasik estimates conservatively that there are at least 6*1010 land 
birds, 1011 land mammals, and 1013 fish. Animals in each of these categories alone are 
several times more numerous than livestock.
if wild animals’ well-being is indeed below the threshold for a life worth living, 
and the above numbers are remotely correct, the scale of wild animal suffering is vast. 
As richard dawkins writes, ‘during the minute it takes me to compose this sentence, 
thousands of animals are being eaten alive; others are running for their lives, whim-
pering with fear; others are being slowly devoured from within by rasping parasites; 
thousands of all kinds are dying of starvation, thirst and disease.’ (dawkins 1996) if 
they accept the premises so far, consistent vegetarians should focus on preventing 
the existence of as many wild animals as possible, since even a small reduction in the 
global number of wild animals would outweigh the impact of ending all livestock 
production. for example, they could reduce animal populations by sterilising them, 
or by destroying highly dense animal habitats such as rainforests. it may even be the 
case that vegetarians should react to this argument by eating more meat, since feeding 
livestock requires more surface area for agriculture, and fields contain far fewer wild 
animals per square kilometre than other biomes such as forests (matheny and Chan 
2005, 585). of course, to the extent that it is more difficult to reduce wild animal popu-
lations than farm animal populations, vegetarians should focus more resources on the 
latter. but it seems implausible that it would be over a hundred times more difficult to 
achieve the same proportional reduction, which is what would be needed to reverse 
my conclusion that wild animal suffering dominates. There could be some simple 
ways, for instance, for vegetarians to reduce habitat sizes: supporting the construc-
tion of large parking lots, or donating to a pro-deforestation lobby. in the final para-
graph, i touch upon the issue of how most effectively to reduce wild animal suffering.
objeCTionS in PrinCiPle
An intuitive response to wild animal suffering can be that cycles of predation 
and starvation are natural, and therefore they must be neutral morally. but what is 
natural is not necessarily what is good, for instance, humans will routinely use tech-
nology to remove diseases which are natural.
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it is important to emphasize that the claim that wild animal suffering is bad does 
not imply a guilt claim of the form ‘predators are morally guilty’. A lion’s instinct 
is indeed natural and does not deserve our moral condemnation. however, we can 
avoid much confusion if we remember to keep separate the concepts of guilt of an 
agent and wrongness of an action. it is perfectly possible to claim that x is harmful 
and should be prevented while also holding that the direct cause of x is not a moral 
agent. The fact that we are so used to thinking about cases of human behaviour, 
where guilt and wrongness are largely aligned, may partly explain why arguments 
about wild animal suffering seem counter-intuitive.
Underlying some of these principled arguments is the intuition that harmful 
acts, like killing livestock, are worse than harmful omissions, like failing to avert wild 
animal suffering. Consequentialists should reject these intuitions. it is not my goal 
here to convince non-consequentialists to abandon the act-omission distinction. 
however, i offer them a thought experiment to suggest that harmful omissions matter 
at least somewhat. imagine you see a fire spreading in a forest and, while walking 
away from the fire, you see an injured fawn: a broken leg prevents her from fleeing. 
You carry a rifle and could instantly kill the fawn at no cost to yourself, preventing 
her from the extreme suffering of being burned alive. in this situation, for vegetarians 
who care about harm to animals, it is clear that it would be immoral to omit to act and 
allow wild animal suffering to happen. So the general principle that allowing wild 
animals to suffer is morally neutral cannot hold.
emPiriCAl objeCTionS
A second set of counter-arguments are empirical: they concede that consistent 
vegetarians would be morally obliged to reduce wild animal suffering, but attack 
various empirical claims made above.
it may be objected that we cannot reduce the number of animals by sterilising 
them, because as soon as fewer animals are born, more resources (like food and ter-
ritory) become available, which increases the evolutionary payoff of producing more 
animals. if we sterilise some deer, there will at first be fewer fawns, so there will be 
more nuts and berries available, which allows other deer (or other species) to have 
more offspring, until we are back to the original equilibrium. The existence of such 
evolutionary pressures towards an equilibrium population seems plausible, but it 
remains an unsolved empirical question. it may be the case that the population takes 
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several years to reach its equilibrium again, in which case much animal suffering 
would be averted in the meantime. regardless, this is only an objection against one 
particular method for reducing wild animal numbers, and it only tells us that sterili-
sation would be ineffective, not harmful. if we reject sterilisation on these grounds, 
habitat destruction, for instance, evidently does reduce animal numbers for the long 
run.
A frequent objection against intervening in nature is that we are uncertain 
about the consequences: for instance, culling predators might cause an ecological 
catastrophe. While our uncertainty is a good reason to do more research in order 
to reduce it, it is not in principle an argument for inaction. first, we should avoid 
the misconception that inaction is not uncertain: the consequence of inaction is to 
maintain the status quo, and the status quo could be causing vastly more (or less) suf-
fering than we currently estimate. of course, to the extent that we know something 
about the amount of suffering under the status quo, inaction is less uncertain than 
intervention. however, this would only be an argument for inaction if we were risk 
averse about amounts of animal suffering. Such fundamental risk aversion appears 
both theoretically problematic, and, in a case where the status quo already seems to 
contain immense suffering, unintuitive.
in order to see if our aversion to intervene may be caused by a bias in favour 
or the status quo, we can use the reversal test (bostrom and ord 2006), an elegant 
instance of which is provided by the reintroduction of wolves in Scotland, where 
they had been hunted to extinction in the 1700s (bbC news 2007). if we oppose re-
introducing wolves because this would cause their prey to suffer, then we should 
prima facie support sterilising existing wolf populations. The outcome of inaction 
in the sterilisation case is similar to the outcome of action in the reintroduction case, 
and those who oppose both reintroduction and sterilisation should explain what the 
morally relevant difference is.
The strongest counter-arguments are those trying to show that wild animals’ 
lives actually are better than non-existence. This is empirically a very uncertain ques-
tion. how much pain or pleasure animals feel in response to certain stimuli is de-
pendent on facts about their neurology which is not well understood. While we may 
make some reasonable extrapolation from our human experience (being eaten alive 
is very painful), animal subjective experience may differ significantly. While animals 
might experience hedonic adaptation (Shane and loewensein 1999) to their circum-
stances, encounters with predators produce lasting psychological damage similar 
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to post-traumatic stress disorder in humans (zoladz 2008). There is some evidence 
that domesticated animals are less stressed (Wilcox 2016), but measures of stress hor-
mones may not coincide with animals’ revealed preferences (dawkins 2004). Clearly, 
i do not pretend to have solved this difficult question (more research on this neglected 
topic should be a pressing priority for those who agree that wild animal suffering on 
a vast scale would be morally catastrophic). however, i note that these considerations 
should also make us uncertain about the subjective well-being of farmed animals; and 
i have already offered reasons why wild animals plausibly have worse lives than free-
range animals.
eVen if Wild AnimAlS hAVe good liVeS, re-
dUCing SUffering mAY STill be A PrioriTY
even if vegetarians still reject this argument, and believe that wild animals’ lives 
are better than the lives of farm animals, to the extent that they are worth living, this 
does not imply they should do nothing. They should not reduce animal numbers, but 
they should still reduce the suffering of existing animals. because there are so many 
animals and the suffering they undergo can be so extreme, this consideration would 
likely still dominate concern about farmed animals. one could vaccinate animals 
against diseases: rabies has already been eliminated from foxes for human benefit 
(freuling 2013). After elephants’ teeth wear out, they are no longer able to chew food 
and eventually collapse from hunger, after which they may be eaten alive by scaven-
gers and predators. fitting elephants with artificial dentures, which has already been 
done on captive animals, would significantly increase their healthspan (Pearce 2015). 
or one could cull predator populations by allowing more of them to be hunted.
With this type of intervention, as opposed to interventions reducing the number 
of wild animals, a possible concern may be that any advantage given to a particular 
individual by reducing their suffering would increase the suffering of others. for in-
stance, if elephants can eat for longer, more other herbivores will starve; or if we kill 
predators, their prey will proliferate and their competitors will starve. if we think that 
ecosystems lie on such a razor-sharp malthusian equilibrium where all animals are 
strongly competing for every piece of resource, this objection is plausible. but cru-
cially, if we accept this, then it becomes more plausible that wild animals actually do 
have lives that are not worth living: if evolution produces so many animals that each 
can just barely survive, it is likely that they endure much suffering and little pleasure. 
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So it seems like we must either accept that some interventions can reduce extreme 
wild animal suffering, or concede that animals’ lives are plausibly not worth living.
ConClUSion
Some may choose to treat this outlandish conclusion as a reductio against con-
sequentialist ethical vegetarianism (either against the idea that farm animals matter 
morally or against the belief that we should prevent them from coming into existence). 
Perhaps vegetarians who still reject the conclusion should increase their confidence 
that buying free-range meat is a good thing. for those who accept it, the question of 
how most effectively to reduce wild animal suffering is left open. As i have repeatedly 
emphasised, we are still very ignorant about many relevant empirical questions, so 
immediate large-scale intervention will not be very effective. in addition, interven-
tion may have significant backlash effects and reduce sympathy for the anti-speciesist 
message. The best immediate action is probably to produce more research on wild 
animal suffering, in order to make future action more likely to be effective.
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